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INTRODUCTION

For most of this century, American broadcasters suffered from
diminished First Amendment status in comparison with their brethren in the
print media. Broadcasters' editorial judgments were subject to oversight and
second-guessing by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or
Commission) under what was called the "Fairness Doctrine." In 1987, the
FCC ceased to enforce the doctrine and in the following years, Congress
tried several times to revive it. Many observers in the media and on Capitol
Hill now insist the issue is at last dead. Rumors and speculation, though,
continue to abound over an eventual revival of the Fairness Doctrine.
Advocates of the doctrine's return are now looking to the courts to force

* Senior Associate, Maloney & Burch, Washington, D.C. B.A. 1985, M.A. (media
studies) New School for Social Research, 1987; J.D. University of Pennsylvania, 1989.
Before practicing law, the Author had a long career in broadcasting and as an advertising
agency owner. The motion picture Good Morning, Vietnam was based on his experiences
with Armed Forces Radio in Saigon. The Author acknowledges the valuable research
assistance of interns Kim Trager (Indiana University) and Julie Ann Slocum (Texas A&M
University).
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the FCC to do what it has refused to do on its own initiative and what
Congress has been unable to mandate.
This Article examines the history of the Fairness Doctrine and the
more common arguments offered in support of it. If the Fairness Doctrine,
as interpreted by the Commission, upheld by the courts, and encouraged by
Congress' were to be reinstituted, it would actually decrease the likelihood
of public exposure to varying viewpoints by discouraging broadcasters from
covering controversial issues. Furthermore, market forces are achieving the
intended effect of the Fairness Doctrine without directly restraining
broadcasters. Today's media-rich environment and the concurrent evolution
of individual media outlets catering to specific constituencies, has already
allowed the "invisible hand" phenomenon to work in the marketplace of
ideas, just as it does in the commercial marketplace. As a result, the
marketplace is achieving the sort of diversity and access the Fairness
Doctrine was designed to foster but could never attain. Therefore, the
Fairness Doctrine is not necessary in today's media, even though many
commentators are trying to revitalize it.
The term "Fairness Doctrine" refers to a former policy of the FCC
which, with certain minor exceptions,2 mandated that a broadcast station
which presents one viewpoint on a controversial public issue must afford
reasonable opportunity for the presentation of opposing viewpoints. The
personal attack rule, an application of the Fairness Doctrine, required
stations to notify persons when personal attacks were made on them in
discussions of controversial public issues.4

1. Professor William F. Baxter of Stanford University notes that "in various ways
Congress has taken note of and ratified the Commission's 'fairness' requirements." William
F. Baxter, Regulation & Diversity in Communications Media, 64 AM. ECON. REv. 392, 394
(1974).
2. Among the exceptions to the requirements of the Fairness Doctrine were bona fide
news coverage of any legally qualified candidate. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1988).
3. In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regs. Concerning
Alternatives to the Gen. Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Brdcst. Licensees, Report of the
Commission, 2 FCC Rcd. 5272, para. 2 (1987).
4. Id. paras. 89-90. The Fairness Doctrine is distinct from the equal time rule.
Although the personal attack and equal time provisions are codified in 47 C.F.R. § 73.123
(1967), "the more sweeping implications of the 'fairness. doctrine' cannot be found in any
single written document but must be inferred from a series of rather obscure opinions."
Baxter, supra note 1, at 394.
Albeit technically distinct, the two policies are similar in that they both stem from the
same view of the airwaves as a scarce public resource, and, more often than not, are spoken
of as though they were the same thing. Under Section 315 of the Communications Act of
1934, "[i]f any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any
public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other
such candidates for that office." 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1988).
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The Fairness Doctrine has been both defended and opposed on First
Amendment grounds. Backers of the doctrine claim that listeners have the
right to hear all sides of controversial issues. They believe that broadcasters, if left alone, would resort to partisan coverage of such issues. They
base this claim upon the early history of radio. Opponents of the doctrine
claim the doctrine's "chilling effect" dissuaded broadcasters from
examining anything but "safe" issues.5 Enforcement was so subjective,
opponents argued, there was never a reliable way to determine before the
fact what broadcasters could and could not do on the air without running
afoul of the FCC. Moreover, they complain, print media enjoy full First
Amendment protection while electronic media were granted only secondclass status.
New York Governor Mario Cuomo opposes the Fairness Doctrine on
First Amendment grounds. He said in 1987, and reiterated last year, how
he has "never understood the distinction made between electronic and print
media in terms of the reasons for the first amendment... and the basic
rationale for freedom of speech."6
In the 1974 case Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, the
Supreme Court unanimously decided a newspaper is under no obligation to
give any sort of equal time-no matter what the paper's economic power.7
If the Miami Herald,delivered to 37 percent of all households in its region,
escapes any public service obligations, why should each of a dozen local
television stations and forty local radio stations face the prospect of losing
their licenses when disagreements arise over "fairness"?'

Both concepts derived from similar attitudes and were developed over the years side
by side, and, although they are distinct and separate, they both represent governmental intrusions into the programming content of broadcasting.
5. News reporter Bill Monroe told a Senate subcommittee:
[T]here are stations that don't do investigative reporting. There are stations that
confine their documentaries to safe subjects. There are stations that don't
editorialize. There are stations that do editorialize but don't say anything.
There are stations that do outspoken editorials but are scared to endorse
candidates. My opinion is that much of this kind of caution, probably most of it,
is due to a deep feeling that boldness equals trouble with Government, blandness
equals peace.
Freedom of the Press: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Const. Rts. of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 561 (1972) [hereinafter Freedom of the Press Hearings]
(statement of Bill Monroe).
6. If You Can'tStand on Principle,Think About the Money, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
Sept. 6, 1993, at 11, 11 [hereinafter Think About the Money].
7. Miami Herald,418 U.S. 241 (1974); see also Thomas W. Hazlett, The Fairness
Doctrine and the First Amendment, PUB. INTEREST, Summer 1989, at 103, 108.
8. Hazlett, supra note 7, at 108. According to the FCC, the "functional similarities"
between the two media lead to the conclusion that "the constitutional analysis of
government control of content should be no different" for electronic media than for print
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Cuomo blames broadcasters for much of their own problems. "A lot
of the owners, a lot of the people who make profits in this business
(broadcasting)," he said, "will sell freedom for fees; they will make deals
with the Congress; they will accept regulation that they shouldn't be
accepting-all in exchange for an opportunity to make more money."9
Commissioner Quello agrees with Cuomo. He complains broadcasters who
"advertise products and do so much selling and are so influential in news
are at their very worst in trying to promote their own interest to the public
and the government.' ' l
One other fact has exacerbated the situation: fairness, like beauty, is
in the eye of the beholder. The necessarily subjective judgments imposed
on the industry throughout the years led to a Kafkaesque situation in which
broadcasters were never sure what was expected of them nor what they
could be punished for. Rulings were made ad hoc and only after the fact
resulting in what media critic and historian Les Brown calls "a tortured and
complex series of regulations, legislation and litigation which many people,
both within and outside the system, maintain undermines the journalistic
integrity of broadcasting."" Former FCC Chairman Dean Burch put it
nicely: "In the fairness area," he said, "the bond of theory and implementation has come unstuck and all the principal actors-licensees, public
interest advocates, the Commission itself-are in limbo, left to fend for
themselves."' 2
Underlying much of the concern over the Fairness Doctrine is an
uneasy feeling among civil libertarians and some First Amendment

media. In Re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council against TV Station WTVH Syracuse,
N.Y., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, para. 82 (1987) (emphasis in
original) [hereinafter Syracuse Opinion and Order], recons. denied, 3 FCC Red. 2035
(1988), aff'd sub nom. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
Professor Coase likened the present American system of broadcast regulation to:
that which would be found if a commission appointed by the federal government
had the task of selecting those who were to be allowed to publish newspapers and
periodicals in each city, town, and village of the United States. A proposal to do
this would, of course, be rejected out of hand as inconsistent with the doctrine of
freedom of the press. But the broadcasting industry is a source of news and
opinion of comparable importance with newspapers or books and, in fact,
nowadays is commonly included with the press, so far as the doctrine of freedom
of the press is concerned.
R.H. Coase, The FederalCommunications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 7 (1959).
9. Think About the Money, supra note 6, at 11.
10. Interview with James Quello, FCC Commissioner, in Washington, D.C. (May 5,
1994).
11. LES BROWN, THE NEW YORK TIMES ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TELEVISION 139 (1977).
12. FORD ROWAN, BROADCAST FAIRNESS 163 (1984).
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advocates that the doctrine is yet another weapon for the federal government, a government which has never been comfortable with a broadcasting
industry that it cannot control.13 This concern has been validated by
history. Bill Ruder, an Assistant Secretary of Commerce under President
Kennedy, told how Kennedy's administration used the Fairness Doctrine to
challenge and harass right-wing broadcasters, in the hope the challenges
would be so costly that these broadcasters would find it too expensive to
continue their broadcasts. 4 Those who recall the early 1970s are familiar
with Spiro Agnew's heavy-handed and self-serving efforts to intimidate the
press in general, and the broadcast media in particular. Kennedy and
Agnew had ample precedent. As early as 1933, "a member of the Federal
Radio Commission issued a formal statement in which he informed broadcasters that any remarks made over their stations derogatory to or in
criticism of his administration's program and policies would subject the
offending station to a possible revocation of license." 5
In August of 1987, the FCC, under Chairman Dennis Patrick,
abandoned the Fairness Doctrine. 6 The political fallout was astounding.
For more than three years, the Senate refused to confirm any nominees for
seats on the FCC and severely restricted the Commission's budget. Since
then, Congress has repeatedly tried to resurrect the Fairness Doctrine by
legislative fiat but, so far, such efforts have been unsuccessful.
However, the specter of the Fairness Doctrine keeps coming back to
haunt the dreams of First Amendment advocates. 7 In 1992, a coalition of

13. In its 1985 report, the FCC stated:
[T]he broadcast industry is one which is characterized by pervasive regulation.
The fact of this pervasive regulatory authority, including the intrusive power over
program content occasioned by the fairness doctrine, provides governmental
officials with the dangerous opportunity to abuse their position of power in an
attempt either to stifle opinion with which they disagree or to coerce broadcasters
to favor particular viewpoints which further partisan political objectives.
In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regs.,Concerning the
Gen. Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Brdcst. Licensees, Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 143, para.
74 (1985) (proceeding terminated) [hereinafter FCCFairnessDoctrine Report], petitionfor
review sub nom. Radio-Television News Directors Assoc. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir.),
vacated, 831 F.2d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Professor William F. Baxter looked at the history of our governmental regulatory
agencies: "Vigorous, purposeful intervention is a frightening prospect unless the levers are
in the hands of saints with great wisdom, and such men are in very short supply,
particularly in government agencies." Baxter, supra note 1, at 397.
14. Hazlett, supra note 7, at 112-13.
15. EDWARD W. CHESTER, RADIO, TELEVISION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 235 (1969).
16. Syracuse Opinion and Order,supra note 8, para. 2.
17. Within the first month of the Clinton administration, Senator Ernest Hollings,
chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, introduced a bill (S. 334) to write the
doctrine into law amid speculation the President might support the effort. FairnessDoctrine,
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activist groups and several individuals petitioned the FCC to reconsider the
Fairness Doctrine.' 8 On July 28, 1994, a number of those petitioners filed
in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for a writ of mandamus to
force the FCC to act on their petition.'
Two weeks later, another coalition petitioned the Commission for an
emergency ruling reinstating the Fairness Doctrine.20 On the same day,
this second coalition also petitioned for reconsideration of the doctrine as
applied to ballot issues and sought to submit their own petition for
consideration, although two years past the deadline for such petitions."'
Ten days later, a group of media-related and First Amendment advocates
filed pleadings opposed to the coalition's pleadings with the Commission.22
The political philosophy underlying the Fairness Doctrine not only
provides a rationale for the exercise of governmental content regulation in
over-the-air broadcasting, but also lays the groundwork for the expansion
of governmental power into other electronic media, including cable,
satellite, direct distribution systems, and future technologies. The Clinton
administration's new information policy promises some protection for the
media,23 but worrisome First Amendment portents appear on the horizon. 24 Experience with the Fairness Doctrine in the context of broadcast-

QUILL, Mar. 1993, at 7, 7.

18. In Re Arkansas AFL-CIO v. KARK-TV, Little Rock, Ark., Petitionfor Reconsideration of Tracy Westen (petition date Feb. 5, 1992) (copy on file with the Federal
CommunicationsLaw Journal).
19. Tracy Westen v. FCC, Petitionfor Writ ofMandamus (9th Cir. July 28, 1994) (copy
on file with the Federal Communications Law Journal).
20. In re Enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine, Petitionfor Emergency Declaratory
Ruling of the Coalition for a Healthy Cal. (petition date Aug. 11, 1994) (copy on file with
the Federal CommunicationsLaw Journal).
21. In Re Arkansas AFL-CIO v. KARK-TV, Little Rock, Ark., ContingentPetitionfor
Reconsideration of the Coalition for a Healthy Cal. (petition date Aug. 11, 1994) (copy on
file with the Federal Communications Law Journal).
22. In re Enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine, Joint Opposition to Petition for
Emergency DeclaratoryRuling of Radio-Television News Directors Ass'n (petition date
Aug. 22, 1994); In Re Arkansas AFL-CIO v. KARK-TV, Little Rock, Ark., Joint
Opposition to Contingent Petitionfor Reconsideration of National Ass'n of Broadcasters
(petition date Aug. 22, 1994) (copies on file with the Federal Communications Law
Journal).
23. The Clinton administration has called for elimination of many regulatory barriers
and calls its proposals "the most major surgery on the Communications Act since it was
enacted in 1934." Vice President Al Gore, Remarks at the National Press Club (Dec. 21,
1993) (copy on file with the Federal Communications Law Journal).
24. The Clinton administration recognizes that, just as new communications
technologies transcend international boundaries, they also transcend other old boundary lines
"which have long defined different sectors of the information industry." Vice President Al
Gore, Remarks at the Television Academy at UCLA (Jan. 11, 1994) (copy on file with the
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ing leads some to wonder if Congress will now try to impose such rules on
the new media or, in the alternative, to pressure the FCC into reintroducing
the doctrine as a regulatory policy.
I. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
The development of the Fairness Doctrine is intertwined with the
history of American broadcasting. Early commercial uses of radio centered
on maritime uses, "mainly for ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship communication." ' An obstacle quickly developed when transmissions from one
source interfered with another. Trying to outshout each other, early
broadcasters responded to problems of interference by increasing the power
of their transmitters which, of course, accomplished little except to increase
the electronic cacophony. The first attempt by the federal government to
deal with the confused clamor of competing voices on the airwaves was the
Radio Act of 1912, which put the task of bringing order out of the
electronic chaos in the hands of the Secretary of Commerce.26 Secretary
of Commerce Herbert Hoover tried to place conditions on licenses, but "his
power to regulate radio stations in this way was destroyed by court
decisions interpreting the 1912 Act." 27
The tug of war between the government and the broadcasters for
control of the airwaves continued in 1925, when the Senate responded to
the general concern of whether broadcasters might exert some sort of
squatters' rights over the frequencies. The Senate passed a resolution
declaring the electromagnetic spectrum to be "the inalienable possession of
the people of the United States."28 A year later, Congress passed a joint
resolution which required licensees to waive any right to the wavelength
they used.2 9 Even so, the system quickly developed so as to provide
licensees with what amounted to de facto property rights. "Even before
Congress passed the 1927 Act, most observers recognized that stations were
being transferred from one owner to another at prices which implied the
right to a license was being sold."3

Federal CommunicationsLaw Journal).
25. Coase, supra note 8, at 1.
26. Act of Aug. 13, 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302, repealed by Radio Act of 1927, ch.
169, 44 Stat. 1162; see also Coase, supra note 8, at 2, 4.
27. Coase, supra note 8, at 4.
28. Id. at 6.
29. Id. at 5, 31-32.
30. Id. at 23.
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Although few stations were on the air before 1920, by November
1922, 564 broadcasting stations were operating in the United States.3 By
1927, the confusion of the airwaves had increased to the point where most
parties involved agreed on the need for an impartial arbiter to assign
frequencies, limit signal strengths, and set out geographical coverage
32

areas.
The chaos that developed as more and more enthusiastic pioneers
entered the field of radio was indescribable. Amateurs crossed signals
with professional broadcasters. Many of the professionals broadcast on
the same wave length and either came to a gentleman's agreement to
divide the hours of broadcasting or blithely set about cutting one
another's throats by broadcasting simultaneously. Listeners thus
experienced the annoyance of trying to hear one program against the
raucous background of another. Ship-to-shore communication in Morse
code added its pulsing dots and dashes to the silly symphony of sound.
... Private enterprise, over seven long years, failed to set its
own house in order. Cutthroat competition at once retarded radio's
orderly development and subjected listeners to intolerable strain and
inconvenience.33

But the Radio Act of 1927 went far beyond needed traffic-cop functions. 34 It supplanted the regulatory functions of the Secretary of Commerce with its new creation, the Federal Radio Commission-forerunner of
the FCC. Although in one breath the statute explicitly forbade program
censorship,35 it also gave the new Commission authority to regulate the
programming of the stations it licensed.36 The 1927 Act included, a
31. Id. at 4.
32. Nicholas Johnson, Towers of Babel: The Chaos in Radio Spectrum Utilization and
Allocation, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 505, 505 (1969).
33. CHARLES A. SIEPMANN, RADIO, TELEVISION AND SOCIETY 5-6 (1950).

34. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162, repealed by Communications Act of
1934, ch. 652, § 602(a), 48 Stat. 1064.
35. Part of the 1927 Act read:
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the licensing
authority the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals
transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be
promulgated or fixed by the licensing authority which shall interfere with the right
of free speech by means of radio communications.
Id. at 1172-73; see also Mark S. Fowler & Daniel.L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to

Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 217 (1982) ("The first amendment to the
Constitution and section 326 of the Communications Act both forbid censorship of
broadcasters.").
36. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934). In 1921, long before
there had been any consensus about the government's right to control broadcasting or the
manner in which they could do it, Herbert Hoover, without any statutory authority, began
to issue station licenses. What is little known is that Hoover allotted only a single frequency
to all commercial broadcasters: 833 kilocycles. All stations were forced to occupy the same
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requirement that if a legally qualified candidate for public office was
allowed to use
a licensee's facilities, all other candidates must be allowed
37
equal access.
The federal government thereafter controlled the airwaves' content,
and it was not long before the Commission exercised its newly-found
power by denying a license renewal to an Iowa station owner.38 The
owner used his station to launch attacks on persons and institutions he
disliked.39 The FCC commented enigmatically, "Though we may not
censor, it is our duty to see that broadcast licenses do not afford mere
personal organs, and also to see that a standard of refinement fitting our
day and generation is maintained."4'
In 1940, Mayflower Broadcasting unsuccessfully attempted to apply
for the license of a Boston station, WAAB.4 1 While denying Mayflower
the license and renewing the license in favor of the incumbent, the
Commission criticized the incumbent licensee for editorializing about
controversial public subjects and favoring certain political candidates.42
The station's license was renewed only after it showed it was complying
with a policy to stop editorializing.43 The result was all too predictable:
through the 1930s and early 1940s, broadcasters totally abandoned the
practice of editorializing and dropped much programming that might have
been thought controversial.'
Another important decision in the development of the Fairness
Doctrine was NBC v. United States.45 Writing for the Supreme Court,
Justice Frankfurter spoke of the situation prior to 1927 as "confusion and
chaos" which

channel. There was bedlam as stations tried to drown each other out. While everyone looked
to the government to impartially control the chaos, the government exacerbated the problem
and then pointed to the result as justification for further governmental control of
broadcasting. By either omitting or burying this critical piece of information, many
broadcast historians-including the respected but anti-corporate Erik Barnouw-lead the
unwary reader to assume there were as many frequencies to choose from then as there are
today. The natural but incorrect inference is that chaos would result even now without
benign governmental intervention to assign spectrum space. L.A. PowE, AMERICAN
BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 58 (1987).
37. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162, 1170 (repealed 1934).
38. Coase, supra note 8, at 9.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting Edward C. Caldwell, Censorship of Radio Programs, 1 J.RADIO L.
441, 473 (1931)).
41. In re Mayflower Brdcst. Corp., Decision and Order, 8 F.C.C. 333 (1940).
42. Id. at 339-41.

43. Id.
44. Baxter, supra note 1, at 393.
45. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
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was attributable to certain basic facts about radio as a means of
communications-its facilities are limited; they are not available to all
who may wish to use them; the radio spectrum simply is not large
enough to accommodate everybody. There is a fixed natural limitation
upon the number
of stations that can operate without interfering with
46
one another.
Two FCC reports were important in early clarification of the Fairness
Doctrine because they indicated the government's intent to strictly control
content. In 1946, the Commission published the Public Service Responsibility of BroadcastLicensees, which warned that the Commission would
thereafter pay closer attention to broadcasters' programming.47 Moreover,
in 1948, the Commission reexamined the Mayflower decision and issued
another report, this time encouraging editorials, but requiring "overall fair4
ness."
In 1959, Congress amended Section 315 of the Communications Act
of 1934 and included the phrase: "Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall
be construed as relieving broadcasters ... from the obligation imposed
upon them under this Act to operate in the public interest and to afford
reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of
'
public importance."49
The Commission chose to construe the added phrase
as codification of the Fairness Doctrine by Congress,"0 although the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia later rejected that decision."s

46. Id. at 213 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
47. FCC, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAST LICENSEES 55 (1946). The
report became known as the "Blue Book" for the color of its binding. The Blue Book
combined governmental concerns over service to local communities with a curious hostility
to the profit motive. It cautioned that, thereafter, the Commission was going to look more
closely at stations' programs and would view more favorably those stations that avoided
"advertising excesses" and carried sustaining programs, local live programs, and discussions
of public issues. The FCC suggested sustaining programs be used for:
(a) maintaining an overall program balance, (b) providing time for programs
inappropriate for sponsorship, (c) providing time for programs serving particular
minority tastes and interests, (d) providing time for non-profit organizations-religions, civic, agricultural, labor, educational, etc., and (e) providing time
for experiment and for unfettered artistic self-expression.
Id.; see also Coase, supra note 8, at 1; Fowler & Brenner, supra note 35, at 215. These
proposals were never actively enforced.
48. In re Editorializing by Brdcst. Licensees, Report of the Commission, 13 F.C.C.
1246, para. 7 (1949); see also Baxter, supra note 1, at 393-94; Coase, supra note 8, at 10.
49. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1988).
50. In re The Handling of Pub. Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Pub. Interest
Stds. of the Comm. Act, FairnessReport, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, para. 28 (1974) [hereinafter 1974
FairnessReport].
51. Telecommunications Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501,517-18 (D.C.
Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 806 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919
(1987).
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In 1967, the FCC created more specific rules insuring a right of reply
to both ad hominem attacks on an identified person or group and to any
position taken by a station for or against legally qualified candidates for
any political office."
In 1969, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Fairness Doctrine in the Red Lion decision. 3 The Court justified this
result by noting that more individuals would like to broadcast their views
than there are available frequencies, reaffirming the Court's reasoning in.
NBC v. United States. 4
In response to this "scarcity" argument, broadcasters stressed that the
requirements of the Fairness Doctrine had a subtle but powerful "chilling
effect,"55 leading many of them to abandon their coverage of controversial
issues in favor of "safe" issues. 6 Red Lion noted the broadcasters' arguments, but the Court found the possibility of a chilling effect to be
remote." Nevertheless, the door was left open for further consideration:
"[I]f experience with the administration of those doctrines, indicates that
they have the net effect of reducing rather than enhancing the volume and
quality of coverage, there will be time enough to reconsider the constitu'
tional implications."58
II.

THE DOWNFALL OF THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE

In 1984, the Supreme Court invited an action which would give it a
chance to reverse Red Lion. In FCC v. League of Women Voters of
California,the Court said if the Commission were to show the "fairness
doctrine [has] 'the net effect of reducing rather than enhancing' speech,"

52. 47 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1968).
53. Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 401 (1969); see BROWN, supra note
11, at 359; FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD Guys, THE BAD Guys, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 61-77 (1976).
54. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388-90. The Supreme Court in NBC and Red Lion introduced
a new principle into our First Amendmentjurisprudence: When only a few interests control
a major avenue of communication, those able to speak can be forced by government to
share their access to that avenue.
55. James Quello, veteran FCC Commissioner and former acting chairman, has consistently opposed the idea of the Fairness Doctrine. "It doesn't belong in a nation that is
dedicated to freedom of speech and of press." His opposition to the Fairness Doctrine
comes, at least in part, from his early experience as a broadcast executive where he
encountered concrete examples of the doctrine's chilling effect. Interview with James
Quello, supra note 10.
56. See Freedom of the Press Hearings,supra note 5, at 560-61.
57. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 393.
58. Id.
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the Court would be forced to reconsider the doctrine's constitutional
basis. 9 However, no test case appeared.
In August 1985, the FCC took the bait. The Commission issued a
report concluding the doctrine no longer serves the public interest and,
instead, chills First Amendment speech.60 The Commission predicted that
without the chilling effect of the Fairness Doctrine, it was reasonable to
expect an increase in the coverage of controversial issues of public importance.6 1 In 1987, the FCC formally renounced the Fairness Doctrine.62
Events since then have confirmed the FCC's prediction of more, rather than
less, coverage of controversial issues.63 The amount of opinion-oriented
programming "exploded" over the ensuing six years and the number of
radio talk shows jumped from 400 to more than 900.' Many observers
ascribe this growth directly to the absence of the inhibiting effect of the
Fairness Doctrine.
Nonetheless, powerful congressional forces have dedicated themselves
to reinstating the Fairness Doctrine and have tried to enact it into law.6
Opposition by both Presidents Reagan and Bush kept it from happening
during their terms.66 With the election of President Clinton, though, such
Capitol heavyweights as Ed Markey, Chairman of the House Telecom-

59. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 378-79 n.12 (1984) (quoting Red Lion, 395
U.S. at 393).
60. FCC FairnessDoctrine Report, supra note 13, paras. 74-76.
61. Id. para. 130. The Commission determined that the net effect of the Fairness
Doctrine was to reduce coverage of controversial issues of public importance. Id. para. 29.
62. Syracuse Opinion and Order,supra note 8, para. 2.
63. Four years after the Commission ceased enforcing the Fairness Doctrine, the FCC
made evidence public indicating that the marketplace was providing expanded choices of
news and information and even more sources for such programming. Broadcasters' Public
Interest Obligationsand S. 217, The Fairnessin BroadcastingAct of 1991: HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation,102d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-14 (1991) (statement of Alfred C. Sikes, Chairman,
FCC).
64. Jim Cooper, Talkers Bracefor 'Fairness'Assault, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Sept.
6, 1993, at 44, 44.
65. Some see overwhelming sentiment in Congress to bring back the Fairness Doctrine.
As one communications lobbyist, Gigi B. Sohn, deputy director of the Media Access
Project, put it, "What there isn't is the courage to do it. Basically they've been inundated
by followers of conservative talk-show hosts who've been calling them up and telling them
not to. And that's been enough." Rod Dreher, Congress Cowers To Conservatives On
Fairness Doctrine,WASH. TIMEs, July 3, 1994, at A4.
66. Congress attempted to indisputably codify the doctrine with the Fairness in
Broadcasting Act of 1987. H.R. 1937, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 742, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987). President Reagan vetoed it. 133 CONG. REc. 88438 (daily ed. June 23,
1987). President Bush's threat of a veto caused a similar attempt to codify the Fairness
Doctrine to fail in 1989.
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munications Subcommittee,67 and John Dingell, Chairman of the House
Energy and Commerce Committee," viewed the new Democratic administration as unlikely to veto their attempts to bring the doctrine back.69
At first, little resistance was seen to a bill restoring the Fairness
Doctrine. Some support for such a billgrew over the summer of 1993.70
By the winter of 1993, however, talk show hosts, like Rush Limbaugh had
generated nationwide publicity producing a large number of letters from
listeners, opposing the doctrine at a two-to-one margin.7 As a result,
efforts to write it into law were abandoned.72 Limbaugh and other talk

67. Chairman Markey told reporters that he is committed to "putting fairness back on
the books." He added that although Congress is currently preoccupied with the issue of
cable rates, it will eventually focus on the issue of restoring the Fairness Doctrine. Kim
McAvoy, Tho's to Blamefor Cable Rereg Mess?, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 4, 1993,
at 60, 60.
68. "Both Telecommunications Subcommittee Chairman Ed Markey (D-Mass.) and
Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman John Dingell (D-Mich.) are making the
fairness bill a priority." Kim McAvoy, Fairness Doctrine On a Roll, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Aug. 2, 1993, at 39, 39. "And with Bill Clinton in the White House, they're no
longer concerned about a presidential veto." Id. at 40.
69. "The presumption has been since 1987 that the next time we get a Democratic
president, there is going to be a Fairness Doctrine," stated Thomas W. Hazlett, an economist
at the University of California at Davis. Dreher, supra note 65, at A4. The question at hand
is, will President Clinton follow in the footsteps of President Reagan and President Bush?
David Bartlett, president of Radio-Television News Directors Association, was pessimistically watchful of the new administration. "While Mr. Clinton may not have content regulation at the top of his personal agenda, don't count on him to pick fights with the powerful
Democratic congressional leaders who see it as their mission in life to control what goes
out over radio and television." David Bartlett, Monday Memo, BROADCASTING, Jan. 25,
1993, at 18, 18.
70. Washington Watch, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Sept. 20, 1993, at 44, 44.
71. Id. Limbaugh is, perhaps, the most recognizable of the talk show hosts who rail on
the Fairness Doctrine. As evidence of Limbaugh's reputation for opposing the doctrine,
attempts by Congress to codify the doctrine have been referred to in the popular media as
"Hush Rush" legislation. Gigi B. Sohn & Andrew Schwartzman, Fairness Not Silence,
WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1994, at A21. In point of fact, though, a large number of other talk
show hosts also helped to generate mail against the Fairness Doctrine. Former Watergate
conspirator G. Gordon Liddy, now one of the country's top radio personalities said of
attempts to reinstate the Fairness Doctrine, "If they did try to, Rush and I and [Pat]
Buchanan would be all over them like a blanket." Dreher, supra note 65, at A4.
72.
"I take my hat off to Rush Limbaugh and the other conservative talk-show
hosts," said Gigi B. Sohn, deputy director of the Media Access Project. "I think
they're absolutely wrong on the Fairness Doctrine, and I think they know it, but
they've done a spectacular job of cowing Congress into not taking action."
Dreher, supra note 65, at A4.
Although most of the media attention seemed to center on talk radio, it should be noted
that religious broadcasters also lobbied agressively against such legislation. Harry Jessell,
Congress Urges FCCto Deal with FairnessDoctrine, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Mar. 14,
1994, at 14, 14.
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show hosts assert that legislation to reinstate the Fairness Doctrine is an
effort by liberal lawmakers to silence their conservative critics.
Still, considering the long history of the Fairness Doctrine and the
determined attempts by some congressmen to resurrect it, it is reasonable
to assume we have not seen the last of it. 73 Some speculate congressional
pressure may prompt the FCC to reinstate the doctrine as a regulatory
policy, while others suggest the current initiatives to rebuild our communications infrastructure may provide an opportunity for Fairness Doctrine
backers to do surreptitiously what they have so far been unable to do
openly.74
III.

THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE RISE AND FALL OF THE

FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
By contrasting the fifty years with the Fairness Doctrine in effect with
the seven years since the FCC abandoned it, one must conclude that the
Fairness Doctrine did not, in fact, increase the likelihood of public exposure
to varying viewpoints. Rather, the Fairness Doctrine had exactly the
opposite effect and, if reinstated, will not only act as an impediment to the

73. "Clinton advisor George Stephanopoulos assails radio's 'tear-it-down attitude' and
calls for 'more of a balance.' The doctrine is 'not on the front burner right now,' he says.
'But there's always a chance that it's something people might want to look at."' Amy
Bernstein, The Hush-Rush Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 27, 1994, at 12, 12.
74. It has been suggested by some that the Fairness Doctrine will pave its way back into
the legislative arena masked behind politically correct movements concerned with "indecent
programming" and "responsible journalism." Bartlett, supra note 69, at 18.
A few see a sinister government seeking more and more control of mass. communications. Actor Michael Moriarty states that he quit NBC's Law and Order because he was
being written out of the series due to his stand against the Clinton administration's efforts
to halt TV violence. Moriarty claimed "[Attorney General] Reno wants to control mass
communications using the oldest ploy-the children." Joe Flint, Moriarty Quits, Blames
Violence Backlash, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Feb. 7, 1994, at 22, 22.
Moriarty may be prescient, or he may simply be a good legal scholar. The Children's
Television Act of 1990 forced the FCC to reinstate restrictions on advertising during
programming aimed at children and imposed an obligation on broadcasters to provide
programming that affirmatively addresses the "educational and information" needs of young
viewers. Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 303a-303b, 393a, 394
(Supp. IV 1992)).
The 1992 Petition for Reconsideration of the Commission's abandonment of the
Fairness Doctrine-filed by the Arkansas AFL-CIO and the Committee Against Amendment
2-points out the Children's Television Act "regulates broadcast content in a way that
arguably requires much greater discretion than the fairness doctrine." They imply that, for
this reason it would be fitting and proper to restore the doctrine. Some of the recent filings
of August 1994, discussed supra notes 20-21, incorporate this argument.
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public's right to know but will actually accelerate its negative effect on that
75

right.

A.

Rationalesfor Governmental Control of Content
A frequently offered justification for governmental intrusion into the
content of radio and television programming is the theory that broadcasters
do not have any property rights in the narrow piece of frequency spectrum
on which they broadcast.7 6 Rather, the spectrum is supposedly public
property, and each broadcaster has only a limited right to its assigned
frequency, subject to whatever conditions the Commission may impose in
the name of the public interest, convenience, and necessity."
Under this theory, licensees can only use their frequencies as public
trustees and must justify their use of the public spectrum by doing
something for the "public" good. There are several flaws to this viewpoint.
First, there is nothing inherent in the nature of the frequency spectrum
which makes it "naturally" public property.7" Although there has never
been any serious consideration of the notion until lately, contemporary

75.
The fairness doctrine works inherently to defeat its own purpose, for as soon
as a broadcaster arouses public passion by covering a controversial issue, he will
receive an avalanche of complaints alleging a fairness violation. Even if the
complaints are invalid, the broadcaster is subject to costs of time, energy, and
legal fees in order to answer the complaints. Such costs deter the small
broadcaster from covering controversial issues; and it is the small broadcaster, not
CBS, ABC, or NBC, who operates in small localities who must carry varying
viewpoints if the United States is to make intellectual progress.
Bruce Fein, First Class FirstAmendment Rights For Broadcasters,10 HARV. J.L. & PuB.
POL'Y 81, 82 (1987).
76. But see Fowler & Brenner, supra note 35, at 247 ("[T]he reasonable expectation of
license renewal enjoyed by broadcasters today comes close to a property right, in reality if
not in name.").
77. Professor Coase traces the origin of the phrase "public interest, convenience, and
necessity" to public utility legislation. He points to its lack of any definite meaning and
suggests that "the many inconsistencies in Commission decisions have made it impossible
for the phrase to acquire a definite meaning in the process of regulation." Coase, supra note
8, at 8-9. The phrase "means about as little as any phrase that the drafters of the Act could
have used and still comply with the constitutional requirement that there be some standard
to guide the administrative wisdom of the licensing authority." Id. at 8 (quoting Louis G.
Caldwell, The Standardof Public Interest, Convenience or Necessity as Used in the Radio
Act of 1927, 1 AiR L. RaV. 295, 296 (1930)).
78. Professor Baxter has pointed out how a
system of private ownership and private enforcement [similar to property rights
in land] might have been adopted with regard to the radio spectrum, the initial
allocation being made on the basis of historical priority as to use, unused portions
being left subject to future private appropriation, as was done with the unclaimed
lands of the Western territories.
Baxter, supra note 1, at 392.
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literature contains some interesting arguments to justify the assignment of
a limited number of legally enforceable private property rights to spectrum
users.
At the time the Communications Act of 1934 was drafted, little was
said or written to provide a philosophical rationale for the concept of
treating the spectrum as public property. It merely was presented as a selfevident, almost axiomatic, "given. ' 79 However, the concept of broadcaster
as a public trustee is not carved in constitutional granite; it is the product
of a congressional declaration. Even accepting the theory of public
ownership of the airwaves, there is no automatic justification for the
government's intrusion into the content of the individual licensee's
programming, beyond the sort of regulation properly imposed upon printed
material.
The Supreme Court has attempted to justify the Fairness Doctrine's
conflict with broadcasters' journalistic First Amendment rights by simply
declaring such constitutional rights to be subordinate to broadcasters'
"trustee" obligations-imposed in return for granting them the privilege of
using "public" airwaves. 80 The Commission, however, pointed out, "It is
well-established that government may not condition the receipt of a public
benefit on the relinquishment of a constitutional right."'"
Another frequently advanced justification for governmental intrusion
into broadcast content looks to the medium's "pervasiveness." This
argument, when reduced to its essentials, holds that the more effectively a
medium persuades the public, the more it must be regulated. The corollary
is that only completely ineffective media are entitled to full freedom from
regulation. The "pervasiveness" rationale fails to account for the disparate
treatment accorded to other equally or more pervasive media:
One can hardly argue a one-newspaper town is not "pervaded,"
"uniquely," by the orientation of its paper. A blockbuster motion
picture, unlike a typical television or radio broadcast, is repeated for
weeks on end in a community. Its exhibition is also more likely to
pervade the community's consciousness than a single television... [or
radio] broadcast.82
Furthermore, the "pervasiveness" argument could not have been one
of the original justifications for the public trustee theory since, in its
beginning, radio could not have been pervasive. Pervasiveness is a quality

79. "Support for the 1927 Act came, in part, from a belief that no other solution was
possible, and, as we have seen, the rationale which has developed since certainly largely
reflects this view." Coase, supra note 8, at 31.
80. Metro Brdcst., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 567 (1990).
81. Syracuse Opinion and Order,supra note 8, para. 80.
82. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 35, at 228.
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the electronic media developed slowly, and it would have taken quite a
visionary to have foreseen, at the turn of the century, the vast system of
broadcasting as it would evolve in the following eighty years.
Finally, the "pervasiveness" rationale exaggerates the effectiveness of
individual stations and neglects to distinguish the effectiveness of those
individual stations (which are regulated) from the effectiveness of the
industry as a whole (which is what, arguably, is pervasive).
The FCC justified the continuation of the Fairness Doctrine by
asserting that to achieve adequate coverage, opposing viewpoints must have
essentially identical access to identical media.83 The FCC rejected the
argument that an adequate presentation of opposing viewpoints in print
media or on another station is enough to achieve the goal of informing the
public on important matters, although it "recognize[d] that citizens receive
information on public issues from a variety of sources." 4 Instead, the
FCC relied on three other contentions.
First, the Commission claimed that Congress, by amending Section
315(a) of the 1934 Communications Act, was giving statutory approval to
the Fairness Doctrine." However, the statutory language is highly
ambiguous, and even those sections that seem clear are constitutionally
doubtful.8 6
Second, the FCC cited the relative ease of enforcing the doctrine.
Without the doctrine "it would be an administrative nightmare ... to
attempt to review the overall coverage of an issue in all of the broadcast
stations and publications in a given market."87 The report seemed to
assume that it would be necessary to affirmatively examine the entire
marketplace of ideas, rather than to presume overall coverage to be
adequate unless a complainant produced evidence to the contrary. Merely
because it is possible or easy to do something, however, is no reason to
infer it is right or even constitutionally permissible.

83. 1974 FairnessReport,supra note 50, para. 28. It should be noted how philosophical
disagreement rages over the relativistic concept that opinions on either side of any question
are always equally valid. Commissioner Quello likes to suggest that under the Fairness
Doctrine, any station that editorializes for God, Mother, and Country should give some
response time to atheism, bastardy, and subversion. Interview with James Quello, supra note
10.
84. 1974 FairnessReport, supra note 50, para. 28.
85. Id.
86. See Telecommunications Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 517-18
(D.C. Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 806 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S.
919 (1987).
87. 1974 FairnessReport, supra note 50, para. 28.
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The third justification was the likelihood the doctrine would achieve
its stated goal of exposing the public to varying points of view.88 In what
amounted to a statement that the end justifies the means, the Commission
declared that "the requirement that each station provide for contrasting
views greatly increases the likelihood that individual members of the public
will be exposed to varying points of view."8 9 However, as shown, the
Fairness Doctrine has been unsuccessful in achieving its goals-especially
considering other, less intrusive ways to achieve the same objective.
B.

The Scarcity Rationale

The theoretical cornerstone for reducing broadcasters' First Amendment protection has always been spectrum scarcity. 9 The idea dates back
to the early days of broadcasting when there were few stations on the air.
Because stations were scarce, the government asserted, it could impose an
obligation to serve all the needs of all potential listeners upon the few
stations in existence. This scarcity theory began in 1929 when the Federal
Radio Commission stated its policy was predicated upon the assumption
that any given station had a duty to serve the entire listeningpublic within
the service area of a station. 9' This argument is still used today without
change.
As late as 1969, when there were approximately 837 television
stations and 6565 radio stations on the air in this country,92 the Supreme
Court was still saying each station must be perfectly balanced in its
presentation of controversial issues because spectrum scarcity precludes a
large enough number of diverse voices to yield aggregate balance. 93 The
rejection of an overall market view of balance might have been justified in
the early part of this century, but it has little factual support in today's
94
abundant media environment.

88. Id.
89. Id. (emphasis in original).
90. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 35, at 221.
91. In re Application of Great Lakes Brdcst. Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32 (1929), rev'd
in part on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1930), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706
(1930).

92. CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING & JOHN M. KiTTROSS, STAY TUNED: A CONCISE
HISTORY OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 633 (2d ed. 1990).
93. Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969); see also Baxter, supra
note 1, at 394.
94. A number of courts are now recognizing the profusion of media outlets available
in almost all markets. In Arkansas AFL-CIO, the court predicted the Supreme Court would
be likely to reconsider Red Lion "now that broadcast frequencies and channels have become
much more available." Arkansas AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430, 1442 n.12, 1443 (8th Cir.
1993) (Arnold, J., concurring).
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While the scarcity argument is no longer justified by current reality,

it has been sustained through the semantic sleight-of-hand of switching, in
mid-argument, between two meanings of the word "scarcity." In 1943,

Justice Frankfurter gave his imprimatur to what has become an ongoing
confusion between the use of a radio station and its ownership. His opinion
in NBC v. United States referred to scarcity in two ways in the same

paragraph: the number of people simply wanting to use a station and the
number of frequency slots available for operating stations." In Red Lion,
Justice White perpetuated the fallacy by implying that every person who
wants a broadcast license represents a different position on important
issues.96
An article by former FCC Chairman Newton N. Minow superbly
illustrates the confusion between those wanting a license and those with
unique viewpoints.97 In his article, Minow proclaimed the "proper test" for
scarcity to be "the number of citizens who want a broadcast license and are
unable to obtain one. At that point, a decision must be made as to who is
to be allowed, and who denied, the exclusive license to use the channels."98 To illustrate what he meant by "scarcity," Mr. Minow cited the
RKO television channels which were opened to competitive application in
the mid-1980s. The FCC, said Minow, "quickly got 172 applications, each

In a subsequent case, the Eighth Circuit quoted Arkansas AFL-CIO pointing out that
"technological changes since the Supreme Court decided Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC
in 1969 have largely undermined the basis for the existing pervasive federal regulation of
the broadcasting industry as a whole and, as a result, 'raise a significant possibility that the
First Amendment balance struck in Red Lion would look different today."' Forbes v.
Arkansas Educ. TV Comm. Network Found., 22 F.3d 1423, 1431 (8th Cir. 1994)
(McMillian, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), reh'g denied, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14,717 (8th Cir. June 14, 1994).
The D.C. Circuit also invited the Supreme Court to revisit Red Lion, observing how
such analysis "inevitably leads to strained reasoning" and concluding "the line drawn
between the print media and the broadcast media, resting as it does on the physical scarcity
of the latter, is a distinction without a difference." Telecommunications Research and Action
Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir.), reh'gen bane denied, 806 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987).
95. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943).
96. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 367.
[I]t is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast
comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish. If 100
persons want broadcast licenses but there are only 10 frequencies to allocate, all
of them may have the same "right" to a license; but if there is to be any effective
communication by radio, only a few can be licensed and the rest must be barred
from the airwaves.
Id. at 388-89.
97. Newton N. Minow, Being Fair to the FairnessDoctrine, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,
1985, at A23.
98. Id.
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applicant arguing, '[g]ive the license to me, and turn down the other
17 1.,""'

Minow declared, "Scarcity still exists when channels are not available
to all."' 00 Note carefully the shift in the meaning of the word "available."
Traditionally, when speaking of controversial ideas, "availability" concerns
only access to speak on some station or other. But, to portray what he
meant by "availability," Mr. Minow -cited the RKO television channels.
Further, he pointed to the "almost 14,000 applications" for the new lowpower television stations.' The implication is that in the case of RKO,
172 distinct points of view are clamoring to be heard; in the case of lowpower television, almost 14,000. Of course, Minow's examples are not
cases of people desperate for a broadcast license so they can espouse their
unique political opinion. They are, rather, businesspersons who see a
chance to acquire a valuable asset. There is no scarcity of outlets for
differing viewpoints, only an overabundance of citizens who correctly see
a broadcast license as a chance to make money.
The logical fallacy here is of mistaking those who want to use
available frequency as a station owner for those who want to use the same
frequency to express a particular viewpoint on a public issue. Don R. Le
Duc of the University of Wisconsin wrote, "The U.S. legal system must
develop the capacity to distinguish between channels and content as the
source of communications competition, a distinction that has eluded the
federal government for the past half-century."' '
IV.

THE MARKETPLACE AS AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION

The latter part of the twentieth century has become an age of
broadcast specialization. That was not the case, however, when the Fairness
Doctrine was developed. In the early days of radio, it was not uncommon
for a geographic area to have only one station. Therefore, with what
amounted to a temporary monopoly on radio listeners, pioneer stations tried
to serve as many of the varied tastes and needs of their audiences as possi10 3
ble.

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Don R. Le Duc, Deregulation andthe Dream of Diversity, J. COMM., Autumn 1982,
at 164, 164 (emphasis in original).
103. The relationship between station and community envisioned in those early days is
similar to the way the Armed Forces Radio Service (AFRS) now serves American military
personnel overseas. In some foreign countries, the AFRS station may be the only source of
information, education, and entertainment available by radio for those who do not speak the
native language. Hence, the AFRS station must be "all things to all persons" by offering a
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Even when the radio industry had developed to the stage where two
or three stations were serving most markets, stations would still vie with
each other for the largest possible share of the potential audience. They did
so by trying to serve, at one time or another in the programming day or
week, as many listeners as possible. The result-what came to be called
"block" programming-was a mix similar to today's network television
fare, in that it was designed to develop listener preferences for particular
programs, not necessarily for particular stations. Unlike today, early radio
listeners probably never thought of preferring to listen to a particular radio
station. Back then, a family might start an evening of radio listening with
Jack Benny, then change stations to hear Edgar Bergen and Charlie
McCarthy, then move to yet another station to end their evening with Bums
and Allen or Fibber McGee and Molly.
A.

Narrowcasting

With today's proliferation of radio and television stations, we have
entered an era of what broadcasters call "narrowcasting." The term
"narrowcasting" describes a business strategy by which each station selects
a particular special-interest segment of the larger overall audience and aims
its programming solely at that particular audience segment.
In radio, the shift to narrowcasting happened decades ago. Today, a
typical radio market includes at least one talk station, a religious station, an
all-news station, and some non-commercial stations. Some stations-like
NPR-aim their programming toward an educated middle class. Some cater
exclusively to a politically liberal audience (e.g., Pacifica stations), while
others program for a conservative constituency. There are foreign-language
stations and stations serving minority groups. Although most formats are
musical, there is specialization in the kind of music played. There are
classical stations, jazz stations, and country stations, while the general field
of "popular" music is divided into subcategories: top 40, new age, heavy

wide variety of programs designed to appeal to all listener tastes. It is instructive to see how
this programming philosophy parallels the duty imposed on 1930s broadcasters by the
Federal Radio Commission.
[Tihe tastes, needs, and desires of all substantial groups among the listening
public should be met, in some fair proportion, by a well-rounded program, in
which entertainment, consisting of music of both classical and lighter grades,
religion, education and instruction, important public events, discussions of public
questions, weather, market reports and news, and matters of interest to all
members of the family find a place.
In re Application of Great Lakes Brdcst. Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32, 34 (1929), rev'd in
part on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47

metal, oldies, middle of the road, and album-oriented rock."° There are
some government-operated stations that broadcast nothing but time signals,
and others that provide weather information, twenty-four hours a day. There
is perhaps no more powerful refutation of the philosophy underlying the
Fairness Doctrine than to compare today's radio reality with the Red Lion
reasoning, mired as it was in the outmoded concept of every station having
a duty to serve the entire listening public.
When commercial television began after World War II, the pattern of
development from general to particular programming that occurred in radio
repeated itself. At first, with only one or two television stations in any
market, broadcasters felt they had to serve a wide variety of programming
tastes by presenting a menu of program types designed to appeal to a
variety of audience subgroups." 5
The first instance of stations devoting themselves to specialized
programming in television was the 1950s development of educational TV
stations, which evolved into what we now call public broadcasting. 6 The
use of UHF channels led to more stations with varied programming,
including some stations that adopted programming designed to serve
minority interests, foreign-language viewers, or the religiously devout.
The large channel capability of cable television, coupled with the
distributional ease afforded by satellites, has already produced not just
stations, but entire television networks devoted to specialty concerns. 7
There are cable networks exclusively devoted to news, sports, religion,
public affairs,"8 minority interests, ethnic culture,0 9 home shopping,
new movies, old movies, erotic titillation, and weather.
Narrowcasting, both in radio and television, now provides an
important service to the listening and viewing public. It provides predict-

104. See I BROADCASTING AND CABLE Y.B. B-511 (1994).
105. See generally ERIK BARNOUW, THE SPONSOR 9-41 (1978) (tracing the development
of radio and television).
106. ERIK BARNOUW, TUBE OF PLENTY: THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN TELEVISION
140-43 (1975).
107. Pundits predict that compression techniques combined with fiber optics will result
in exponentially greater channel capacity for cable systems. One figure frequently cited is
500 channels, although this is a totally arbitrary number that has caught the fancy of the
popular media. Far more channel capacity than 500 is already possible with present
technology.
108. One cable network, C-SPAN, provides continual live coverage of congressional
hearings and floor debates.
109. It is interesting that although foreign-language stations do program for a specific
audience, that audience itself is segmented by programming preference. Although the
programs are all in, for example, Spanish, they run the gamut of programming types from
music to drama to news. Foreign-language narrowcasting may be on the horizon.
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ability and continual availability of desired programming. A country music
devotee knows where on the dial to tune at any time of the day or night to
find the service he or she desires. No longer must one wait until the regular
newscast to hear about the weather. It is there whenever it is needed.
A corollary advantage of such specialization of formats is that,
because a given media outlet does not have to be all things to all people,
it can deal with a specific subject in greater detail without fearing massive
tune-outs. Weather channels give not only the daily local forecast, but also
the national forecast, the marine forecast, the aviation forecast, and the
long-range forecast. Classical music stations can devote a full day to a
performance of Wagner's Ring Cycle. NPR's All Things Considered
frequently spends the major part of an entire half-hour segment on an indepth examination of a particular news story or public issue. C-SPAN,
NPR, and CNN have provided live coverage of the Iran-Contra hearings,
confirmation hearings for Judges Bork and Thomas, Lani Guinier, Zoe
Baird, and the Whitewater hearings.
The radio industry is already dedicated to the programming philosophy of narrowcasting. Television is unquestionably headed in the same
direction. With narrowcasting, market forces "move the key resource-time
on an exclusive broadcasting frequency-toward its highest and best
use.""' Commercial broadcasters maximize profits by providing the
service they believe consumers most desire."'
B.

The Overall Market Concept

The phenomenon of narrowcasting leads us to look at the question of
fairness as it applies to an entire medium in a given geographical market.
In practice, an overall market paradigm has already largely replaced the
outmoded requirement of the Fairness Doctrine that mandated complete
balance in the programming of each individual station.
Development of the overall market paradigm supports an inescapable
conclusion: The Fairness Doctrine approach is unnecessary and any residual
attempts to revive it should be permanently abandoned." 2 Stations should
further develop their distinctive programming personalities to appeal to
specific listening constituencies. Choices should be made not only in the
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112. The FCC said, "[T]he growth of traditional broadcast facilities, as well as the
development of new electronic information technologies, provides the public with suitable
access to the marketplace of ideas so as to render the fairness doctrine unnecessary." FCC
FairnessDoctrine Report, supra note 13, para. 82.
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kinds of music or entertainment programs they broadcast, but also in
whether or not they offer programming that delves into public controversies
or features candidates for public office. Stations should be free to take a
particular political posture without fear of coercion, constraint, intimidation,
or reprisal.
Some stations will program no discussions of public issues at all.
Nonetheless, that does not justify the Fairness Doctrine's paternalistic attitude of forcing such programming on listeners who have little or no interest
in it. When listeners have unwanted programs thrust upon them, they "tuneout," either mentally by paying no attention, or literally by changing
stations or simply turning the radio off. As former FCC Commissioner
Mark S. Fowler and colleague Daniel L. Brenner stated, "The public's
interest, then, defines the public interest.""1 3
The possibility of some stations ignoring public issues is balanced by
recent experience which shows that narrowcasting is also leading certain
stations to air little else than issue-oriented programming. The proliferation
of radio talk formats has already shown how stations in sufficiently large
markets, when unfettered and uncontrolled, tend to develop programming
that consistently appeals to particular political, ethnic, or economic
partisans. The limiting factor is not availability of frequencies, but rather,
the existence of enough listeners to justify a particular programming format.
Granted, there may not be adequate listeners to justify accommodating
every fringe or splinter faction. However, is it really necessary to the
proper functioning of a democracy that the federal government assure
platforms in every medium, in every community, for the rantings of bizarre
conspiracy theorists, paranoid delusionists, flat-earthers, anarchists, and
others without any significant constituency?
No responsible viewpoint is in danger of being stifled simply because
it is denied access to a particular station-so long as there are other
available stations. If a demand for a product exists, someone will eventually
undertake to cater to that demand. If all television stations in a given area
shut out a specific viewpoint, there is always radio. In the even more
unlikely event that access to radio is denied as well, there are still
newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and billboards. As Philip B. Kurland
writes, "If there is, in fact, an audience for the message, one form of the
media or another can be counted on to exploit it. If there is no such
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audience, there is no need to compel one form of the media to be a voice
crying in the wilderness.""' 4
CONCLUSION
Allowing the "invisible hand" of market forces to operate in the
marketplace of ideas accommodates all viewpoints with enough proponents
to warrant attention, and achieves the goals of the First Amendment without
intrusive governmental intervention. As predicted by the FCC's 1985
Fairness Doctrine Report, the dynamics of the information-services marketplace assures the public more
than sufficient exposure to controversial
5
issues of public importance."
However, the matter is far from settled. Some desire a return to the
Fairness Doctrine as a part of federal communications regulatory policy.
Others fear those advocating such a policy change may seek to achieve
their goal of media content regulation by using the issue of violence on
television to open the door. Once the door is ajar, something looking very
much like the Fairness Doctrine may be able to slip in unnoticed.
Rather than oppose a move to regulate program content, broadcasters
are succumbing to federal intimidation. While the networks have agreed to
"voluntary" advisories on violent programs, the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) opposes them because broadcasters accede to them under
the threat of harsher governmental regulation. ACLU President Nadine
Strossen says she is re-examining the ACLU's traditional position on the
Fairness Doctrine
in light of the technological changes recently, the proliferation of
channels of communication. My personal view has long been that we
should oppose the Fairness Doctrine as being inconsistent with free
speech principle. The reasons originally given for allowing that kind
of regulation of television when nobody would allow it of the print
media, if they were ever correct, they're certainly no longer correct."16
The ACLU is making sure it is up to speed on challenges presented by the
race to the information superhighway.
With its information superhighway proposals, the Clinton administration has declared its intention to create an environment to stimulate a
private system of free-flowing information conduits. The administration's
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proposals would add $100 billion to the economy during the next ten years
and would create 500,000 new jobs by the end of 1996.,17 Vice President
Gore stated that the administration sees market forces replacing regulations
and judicial models that are no longer appropriate. The administration's
"goal is not to design the market of the future. It is to provide the
principles that shape that market.""' One of those principles should be
to trust in an overall market concept in the coverage of public issues with
the obvious First Amendment advantages it provides. However, some in the
communications industry are uneasy with what they see as White House
demands for excessive surveillance rights; "There's a lot of resentment and
fear about government intrusion," said Paul Somerson, editorial director of
PC/Computing."9 Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole has questioned the
FCC's regulation powers. He said the FCC could not be trusted to regulate
the information superhighway. "I must question the Congress's judgment
when it considers granting the FCC greater regulatory control of the
communications industry, especially when the FCC doesn't seem to realize
that it dropped the ball with the implementation of the Cable TV Act...
120

In the end, it comes down to a matter of whether one believes that the
principles underlying a free market economy are equally applicable to the
marketplace of ideas. The alternative is to believe people must be spoon-fed
whatever ideas the government decides are right. Some call it regulation,
but in reality, it is censorship.
In 1644, electronic media did not exist. Still, John Milton was able to
denounce the principle that government should be able to dictate what
information and ideas could be disseminated.' 2' He said:
Nor is it to the common people less than a reproach; for if we
be so jealous over them, as that we dare not trust them with an English
pamphlet, what do we but censure them for a giddy, vicious, and
ungrounded people; in such a sick and weak state of faith and
discretion, 1as
to be able to take nothing down but through the pipe of
22
a licenser?
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The American people are much the same as the English citizens of whom
Milton spoke."2 They have an almost intuitive feeling for what is fair
and what is not. They neither need, nor deserve, governmental censorship
masquerading in the guise of fairness.
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